From finance to extremism: the real effects of germany's 1931 banking crisis by Doerr, Sebastian et al.
 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
 
DP12806
FROM FINANCE TO EXTREMISM: THE
REAL EFFECTS OF GERMANY’S 1931
BANKING CRISIS
Sebastian Doerr, Stefan Gissler, José Luis Peydró
and Hans-Joachim Voth
ECONOMIC HISTORY and FINANCIAL
ECONOMICS
ISSN 0265-8003
FROM FINANCE TO EXTREMISM: THE REAL
EFFECTS OF GERMANY’S 1931 BANKING CRISIS
Sebastian Doerr, Stefan Gissler, José Luis Peydró and Hans-Joachim Voth
Discussion Paper DP12806
  Published 22 March 2018
  Submitted 22 March 2018
Centre for Economic Policy Research
  33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK
  Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801
  www.cepr.org
  
This Discussion Paper is issued under the auspices of the Centre’s research programme
in ECONOMIC HISTORY and FINANCIAL ECONOMICS. Any opinions expressed here are
those of the author(s) and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Research
disseminated by CEPR may include views on policy, but the Centre itself takes no institutional
policy positions.
  The Centre for Economic Policy Research was established in 1983 as an educational charity,
to promote independent analysis and public discussion of open economies and the relations
among them. It is pluralist and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis
of medium- and long-run policy questions.
  These Discussion Papers often represent preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to
encourage discussion and comment. Citation and use of such a paper should take account of
its provisional character.
  
Copyright: Sebastian Doerr, Stefan Gissler, José Luis Peydró and Hans-Joachim Voth
FROM FINANCE TO EXTREMISM: THE REAL
EFFECTS OF GERMANY’S 1931 BANKING CRISIS
 
Abstract
Do financial crises radicalize voters? For identification, we analyze the canonical case of
Germany in the 1930s exploiting a large bank failure in 1931 caused by fraud, foreign shocks
and political inaction. We use detailed bank-firm connections on banks that (unlike the US)
served the whole country. We provide causal evidence from banking crisis to economic distress
and extreme radical voting, while the literature in general has found no clear effect of economic
distress on Nazi Party support. We show that, first, the failure of Jewish-led Danatbank induced
a strong reduction in the wage bill for connected firms. This led to increasing city-level
unemployment in cities with more Danat-connected firms. The effects are notably stronger in
cities with a higher share of non-exporting firms, where local demand spillovers are higher.
Second, Danat exposure significantly increased Nazi Party support between 1930 and 1933
elections, but not between 1928 and 1930 —before the banking crisis but after the start of the
Great Depression and high unemployment. The financial crisis increased support for the Nazi
party the most in areas with both deep-seated historical anti-Semitism, and more net savers
than borrowers. Not only did the banking crisis help the Nazis rise to power, but cities with
higher Danat exposure saw fewer marriages between Jews and gentiles after the banking crisis.
Also, after 1933, there were more attacks on Jews and their property in Danat-exposed cites,
and deportation rates were higher. 
JEL Classification: N/A
Keywords: Financial crises, Real effects, extremism, Polarisation, Nazi Party, Great Depression,
Germany
Sebastian Doerr - sebastian.doerr@econ.uzh.ch
U Zurich
Stefan Gissler - Stefan.Gissler@frb.gov
Federal Reserve Board
José Luis Peydró - jose.peydro@upf.edu
UPF and CEPR
Hans-Joachim Voth - voth@econ.uzh.ch
UBS Center for Economics in Society and CEPR
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
 1 
 
 
 
From Finance to Extremism:  The Real Effects of Germany’s  
1931 Banking Crisis 
 
 
Sebastian Doerr   Stefan Gissler   José-Luis Peydró   Hans-Joachim Voth 
 
 
Abstract 
Do financial crises radicalize voters? For identification, we analyze the 
canonical case of Germany in the 1930s exploiting a large bank failure in 1931 
caused by fraud, foreign shocks and political inaction. We use detailed bank-
firm connections on banks that (unlike the US) served the whole country. We 
provide causal evidence from banking crisis to economic distress and extreme 
radical voting, while the literature in general has found no clear effect of 
economic distress on Nazi Party support. We show that, first, the failure of 
Jewish-led Danatbank induced a strong reduction in the wage bill for connected 
firms. This led to increasing city-level unemployment in cities with more Danat-
connected firms. The effects are notably stronger in cities with a higher share of 
non-exporting firms, where local demand spillovers are higher.  Second, Danat 
exposure significantly increased Nazi Party support between 1930 and 1933 
elections, but not between 1928 and 1930 —before the banking crisis but after 
the start of the Great Depression and high unemployment. The financial crisis 
increased support for the Nazi party the most in areas with both deep-seated 
historical anti-Semitism, and more net savers than borrowers. Not only did the 
banking crisis help the Nazis rise to power, but cities with higher Danat 
exposure saw fewer marriages between Jews and gentiles after the banking 
crisis. Also, after 1933, there were more attacks on Jews and their property in 
Danat-exposed cites, and deportation rates were higher.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Can a financial crisis fan the flames of fanaticism? The belief that major downturns create 
political instability is widespread. Anti-establishment parties have surged at the polls after 
2008, with radical voting increasing more in countries that were harder-hit by the global 
financial crisis after 2008 (Algan et al 2017).1 Historical cross-country studies similarly 
appear to bear out this prediction (De Bromhead et al 2013; Funke et al 2016). Despite this 
suggestive evidence across time and space, there is a startling shortage of well-identified, 
micro-based evidence documenting a causal effect of financial shocks on political 
radicalization.  
In this paper we examine the canonical case of a radical party coming to power amidst 
economic distress and financial disaster – the rise to power of the Nazi Party and the fall of 
Germany’s first democracy in 1931. Until now, research has focused mainly on the link 
between unemployment and radical voting. Radicalization there was, but the mass army of six 
million unemployed overwhelmingly turned to the Communists to vent their grievances, not 
the Nazis (Falter 1991, King et al 2008). Economic distress, however, took many forms. 
Shortened work hours and a reduction in wages were major sources of income losses, as were 
disruptions to the flow of credit and a collapse of demand from newly under- and unemployed 
workers. Instead of focusing on voting by the unemployed themselves, we examine the 
economic and electoral impact of a large banking crisis during the Great Depression.  
We analyze the German banking crisis that began in the summer of 1931 with the 
collapse of Danatbank, led by prominent Jewish banker Jakob Goldschmidt. After the failure 
of the Austrian Credit-Anstalt in May 1931, there were runs on foreign bank deposits in 
Germany.2 Danatbank faced unsustainable losses in the spring of 1931 because one of its 
borrowers, a large textile firm, defaulted due to fraud and ill-fated speculation (Born 1967, 
Kindleberger 1978, Ferguson and Temin 2003, Schnabel 2004). The unanticipated large 
losses were unrelated to Danat’s other industrial lending activities, but led to its collapse. 
Danat was the second-largest bank in Germany, and – as some leading historians, e.g. Evans 
(2004) and Kershaw (2016), argue— its demise triggered a general banking crisis that tipped 
                                                 
1 Anti-establishment parties include far-right parties such as the Front Nationale in France, the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) in Germany, Freedom Party in Austria, Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, Legga in 
Italy, Law and Justice in Poland, the Swedish Democrats, and the U.K. Independence Party, but also populist 
movements as Podemos in Spain or Five Stars in Italy. Related research has examined the effect of trade shocks 
on polarized voting (Dippel et al 2016, Autor et al 2017). 
2 The absence of an effective political response was partly due to French opposition to an international rescue 
package. Cf. Schnabel 2004.  
 3 
the country from recession into depression. Danat’s scandal-ridden collapse increased anti-
Semitic sentiment in many parts of German society (Schäffer n.d., Goodman 2015); it also 
allowed the Nazi party to exploit in its propaganda a seemingly clear example of economic 
ills caused by prominent Jews. As Dresdner Bank experienced similar problems to Danat and 
the German government eventually forced Dresdner to buy Danat, we use both banks to 
analyze the impact of bank failures on the real economy and voting.3 The reduction in lending 
by both banks was substantially greater than by the other banks in Germany (see Figure 1). 
To identify the effect of bank failures on the real economy and voting, we use newly-
collected data on firm-bank pair lending relationships from a contemporary directory of listed 
firms. Information on bank connections was recorded prior to the bank failure. We analyze 
the firm-level change in the wage bill after the banking crisis, comparing firms connected to 
Danat and Dresdner (Danat henceforth) with those firms borrowing from other banks. We 
also exploit pre-crisis variation in the extent to which firms in different areas of Germany had 
connections with Danat. Importantly, during the Great Depression, banks in Germany were 
not local as in the US, but national with different exposures to different regions. Hence, in 
contrast with US-based studies, we can control for local demand effects (i) at the city level for 
firm-level real effects, exploiting firms in the same city with different banks, and (ii) at the 
region level for city-level unemployment and voting, exploiting different cities’ exposures to 
different banks within a region.  
We first document that firms exposed to Danatbank contracted their wage bill more 
sharply after 1931, compared with both firms connected to other banks in general and to only 
those firms connected with another big universal German banks. There are strong negative 
effects for Danat-connected firms despite the fact that these firms were not riskier before the 
banking crisis than firms connected to the other banks, nor are they different in size, age, or 
leverage compared with firms connected to other large German banks. Moreover, we also 
show that cities where firms had a higher exposure to Danatbank in 1929 experienced a more 
rapid increase in unemployment. This provides additional evidence that declines in credit 
availability have repercussions beyond the firms immediately affected. Interestingly, the 
increase in city-level unemployment was substantially higher in cities with more Danat-
connected non-exporting firms. In these cities, the decline in wage bill of Danat borrowers 
had local demand spillovers on firms in the same area even if they were not directly 
borrowing from Danat. 
                                                 
3 Dresdner also had a high share of Jews at the board level.  
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Second, we show that cities with more firms borrowing from Danatbank before the 
banking crisis experienced a significantly larger increase in Nazi Party support between the 
1930 and 1933 elections. The effects are also statistically and economically significant 
between elections in 1930 and the two elections in 1932; however, there are insignificant 
effects between the 1928 and 1930 elections, i.e. before the banking crisis but after the start of 
the Great Depression and a rapid increase in unemployment.4  
Figure 1 illustrates our main results. The left-most panel shows the strong decline in 
lending by the two banks most affected by the German banking crisis of 1931, Danat and 
Dresdner. While loan volume declined by 10% at Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, lending 
at Danat and Dresdner declined twice as much. Accordingly, the wage bills at firms connected 
with Danat and Dresdner also contracted more rapidly than elsewhere, as illustrated by the 
middle panel. While the average firm saw a reduction of 15% in labor costs (expenditures on 
wages and salaries), at Danat-connected companies the wage bill collapsed by 40%. The 
right-most panel shows the distribution of changes in votes for the Nazis, for cities with high 
and low exposure to Danatbank (measured by the assets of connected firms). There is a clear 
shift to the right for cities with positive exposure; cities with more exposure Danat also 
experienced the biggest increases in support for the Hitler movement.  
Our evidence suggests that in early 1930s Germany, financial distress induced economic 
distress. Because Jews were overrepresented in finance at the time, it was easier for Nazi 
propaganda (e.g. in 1932 speeches by Goebbels, Reich Minister of Propaganda of Nazi 
Germany, or cartoons in Der Stürmer)5 and “hate entrepreneurs” to blame Jews for 
Germany’s economic ills. The reason we propose is that the financial crisis made anti-
Semitism acceptable in bourgeois circles in a way that it was not previously; diaries from the 
time, such as the one by the leading German-Jewish civil servant Hans Schäffer, point to a 
general surge in anti-Semitic sentiment after the banking collapse because of the wide-spread 
                                                 
4 Our results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and tests. Effects from Danat exposure to city 
level unemployment is higher in years when there was a stronger decline in aggregate countrywide lending by 
Danat and Dresdner. In addition to the lack of link between support for Nazis and Danat lending relationships 
prior to Danat’s collapse, we also perform a placebo exercise with another shock that hit the German economy – 
the collapse of world trade. Areas with more export-oriented industries saw sharper declines in employment after 
1930, as one would expect. Nonetheless, we do not find any particular effect of the trade-induced distress on 
Nazi voting. There is also some – weaker – evidence that bank distress increased support for the Communists; 
support for the status quo in general leaked away. However, for the Communists, there is no interaction with 
previous levels of anti-Semitism. 
5 See, for example, Figure B1 in the appendix as well as articles such as “Nazis blame Jews for failure to come 
into power; anti-Jewish agitation renewed” (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 8, 1932, 
https://www.jta.org/1932/09/09/archive/nazis-blame-jews-for-failure-to-come-into-power-anti-jewish-agitation-
renewed) and “Goebbels asks Papen bluntly whether he conferred with Goldschmidt on dissolution” (Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, September 28, 1932,  https://www.jta.org/1932/09/28/archive/goebbels-asks-papen-bluntly-
whether-he-conferred-with-goldschmidt-on-dissolution). 
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involvement of Jews in leading German banks. We argue that where the suffering from 
financial distress was more intense, a political agenda centered on pushing out Jewish 
influence was more readily accepted.  
To demonstrate that this interpretation is correct, we need to show that anti-Semitism 
increased differentially – that cities hit more by the financial crisis because of their exposure 
to Danat became more anti-Semitic more quickly than the rest. To this end, we assemble data 
on Jewish mixed marriages by city. While a rare event and indicative of deep involvement 
between Jews and gentiles, we consider it as a ‘canary in the coalmine’, reflecting not only 
romantic attachment but also the social acceptability of marrying across ethnic lines. Cities 
with more Danat exposure saw a sharper decline of mixed marriages, with a sudden change 
shortly after the outbreak of the banking crisis. Moreover, not only did the banking crisis help 
the Nazis rise to power and increase anti-Semitic sentiment, but it also led to more radical 
action. After 1933, cities with more links to Danat before the crisis (that were hence more 
affected by the banking crisis) witnessed markedly higher deportation rates of Jewish citizens 
to concentration camps, and more violent attacks on synagogues, Jews, and their property 
during the 1938 pogroms (“Reichskristallnacht”).  
Our conclusions are strengthened when we stratify our sample by earlier levels of anti-
Semitism. In areas where anti-Semitic parties had already received support in the 1890s and 
1900s, damage induced by the financial crisis translates into major electoral gains for the 
Nazis; in areas with historically low support for them, higher unemployment due to Danat’s 
collapse did not spell more votes for the Hitler movement, but for the Communist party. In 
other words, where pre-existing attitudes made it plausible to blame the Jews for Germany’s 
economic misfortunes, support for the Nazi Party due to Danat exposure surged particularly 
after 1930. 
Contemporary banking statistics also allow us to contrast areas with a surplus of 
deposits with those where loans dominated. Net creditor regions saw the biggest increases for 
the Nazis in response to Danatbank exposure, suggesting that savers were especially 
susceptible to their message after the banking crisis.6 
Contribution to the literature. We relate to three literatures – the real effects of 
banking crises, the effects of economic shocks on conflict and instability, and the history of 
the Nazi Party’s rise to power in Germany.  
                                                 
6 In the end, depositors (including those of Danat) did not lose money, since their funds were guaranteed by the 
government. Nonetheless, for some time in the summer of 1931, the possibility of losses loomed large. The mere 
prospect of financial losses can change behavior in important ways (Koudijs and Voth 2016). 
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Since Bernanke’s (1983) classic paper, a growing literature has documented the effects 
of financial crises. After the 2008-09 financial crisis, there is clear evidence that firms 
suffered from a credit crunch -- a bank credit crunch as in Ivashina and Sharfstein (2010), or 
Jiménez et al (2012). In addition, firms with bonds that matured when financial markets shut 
down also suffered more (Almeida et al. 2009). More recent evidence shows the real effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis (Chodorow-Reich 2014; Jiménez et al. 2017; Huber 2018).7 
Benmelech et al (2017) use an empirical strategy similar to Almeida et al (2009), and 
demonstrate a link from the 1930s US banking crisis to firm employment.8 Our main 
contribution is to show the impact of a banking crisis on political extremism, not just on real 
effects of unemployment and a credit crunch, which brings long-term costs associated to the 
banking crisis.9   
The conflict literature has investigated the effects of a variety of adverse economic 
shocks, such as rainfall variation or commodity price shocks. Results typically show that 
exogenously induced economic distress makes civil war and other forms of conflict more 
likely (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Miquel et al 2004).10 Autor et al (2016) use exposure to 
trade with China as a source of identification and demonstrate that US electoral districts were 
more likely to support extreme candidates the more adverse the trade shock was. Similarly, 
Dippel et al. (2016) argue that negative trade shocks increased support for radical right-wing 
parties in Germany in recent years. However, Funke et al (2016), analyzing financial crises 
over the past 140 years covering 20 advanced economies and more than 800 general elections, 
find that political extremism does not increase during normal recessions or after severe 
macroeconomic shocks that are not financial in nature. We provide well-identified micro-
evidence showing how a banking crisis lead to political extremism, the rise of the Nazi power 
in 1933, and strong anti-Semitism.  
The rise of the Nazi Party has attracted extensive scholarly attention over the last 80 
years. Initial analysis emphasized either class-based theories (Lipset 1960, Hamilton 1983) or 
theories of the masses (Ortega-y-Gasset 1932, Arendt 1973). The findings based on voting 
records have largely superseded this earlier literature, demonstrating that, far from being a 
party dominated and supported principally by members of the lower middle class, it was a 
                                                 
7 See also Jimenez et al (2014).  
8 For an analysis of the US Great Depression and its banking crisis, see Calomiris (1993) and Calomiris and 
Mason (2003). 
9 Financial crisis can bring medium- or long-term costs by leading to the wrong (economic) policies thereafter 
(Mian et al 2014). In the case of Germany in the 1930s, there is no doubt that the rise of the Nazi party to power 
ultimately triggered one of the worst catastrophes of history, the Second World War, with over 60 million 
casualties. 
10 At the same time, democratic transitions also appear to become more likely during periods of exogenously low 
income (Lipset 1960; Brückner and Ciccone 2009).   
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“catch-all” party that drew support from all walks of German society instead (Falter 1981; 
Childers 1983). Nonetheless, some differences in the cross-section emerge: Research using 
district-level voting results shows that Protestants were much more likely to offer support than 
Catholics, that the better to-do increasingly turned towards the Nazis after 1930, and that the 
unemployed overwhelmingly supported the Communists instead. King et al (2008) use 
ecological inference to show that while a broad-based shift underpinned the Nazi’s rise to 
electoral success, some groups were more susceptible. This is especially true of the self-
employed from high-unemployment areas, and domestic employees from low- to medium- 
unemployment areas. While few would doubt that the rise of the Nazis was facilitated by the 
Great Depression, there is as of now no clear compelling evidence that areas of Germany 
more affected by economic distress turned to the Hitler movement at the polls.11 
We proceed as follows. We first provide historical context and background, then 
describe our data and empirical strategy. Next, we present our main empirical results, before 
discussing the robustness of our findings. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Historical background 
 
In this section, we briefly describe three aspects of the historical context – the Great 
Depression in Germany, the banking crisis of 1931, and the rise of the Nazi Party to power. 
 
A. The Great Depression in Germany 
 
Three features distinguish Germany’s Great Depression – its early onset, origin, and severity. 
While the US downturn began in 1929, Germany’s industrial output had already begun to 
contract in 1927. In contrast to the US experience, German investment began to fall first; 
consumption only began to fall later. In the US, ‘autonomous’ declines in consumption kick-
started the depression (Temin 1976, Romer 1990, Olney 1999). After 1929, declines in 
German output accelerated. Peak-to-trough, German industrial output fell by 40%, while the 
corresponding figure in 20% in Britain and 10% in Japan (Figure 2). The only other major 
industrialized country with a similarly severe decline in economic activity was the US. At its 
peak, Germany counted 6 million unemployed, equivalent to one third of the workforce.  
Unemployment spelled misery, as elsewhere. While the unemployment insurance 
system looked after those losing their jobs, benefits became progressively smaller. After 20-
                                                 
11 One notable exception is Galofré-Vilà et al (2018), who argue that austerity in the form of higher taxes was a 
key reason for pro-Nazi voting.  
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27 weeks, the unemployed only qualified for emergency aid, which offered only minimal 
support.12 Unemployment was only the most visible manifestation of economic misery. While 
some wage earners benefitted from rapid deflation, many small owners and small 
entrepreneurs suffered severe income declines. The wages of civil servants were repeatedly 
cut, as were pension payments, in desperate bid to balance the budget.  
Fiscal austerity was a distinguishing feature of the German slump. The federal 
government, states, and municipalities had borrowed heavily before 1929. A good share of the 
money raised came from abroad. Once international debt markets froze, authorities had to try 
and balance their books, by raising taxes and cutting expenditure.  
Germany’s export industries were not helped by the surge of protectionism after 1929. 
While already saddled with relatively high labor costs, new tariffs and difficulties in 
encountering export financing translated into rapidly falling sales of German products abroad. 
By 1933, German exports had declined by 70 % relative to their 1929 value. 
 
B. The banking crisis of 1931 
 
Germany’s 1931 banking crisis began in Austria. In May of the year, the Austrian Credit-
Anstalt revealed large losses. When it collapsed, foreign deposit withdrawals accelerated in 
other countries, including Germany (Kindleberger 1978). While the Austrian banking crisis 
unfolded, huge losses at a German textile firm, Nordwolle, came to the attention of its bank, 
the Darmstädter Nationalbank (Danat). Nordwolle management had dabbled in ill-timed 
speculation, and also in fraud.  Losses on the loans to the textile firm were large, equivalent to 
80% of Danatbank’s equity – and accordingly, threatened the bank’s survival.  
Once Danatbank realized the scale of its losses, it turned to the German central bank, 
the Reichsbank. A bank holiday was declared for two days in July; transfers and other 
transactions remained barred for over a month (Ferguson and Temin 2003). While the 
Reichsbank attempted to offer support, its ability to do so was severely circumscribed by its 
commitment to the gold standard (James 1985, Schnabel 2004).  
International politics did not help. International support for the Reichsbank – by the 
Bank of England and the Banque de France, say – could have helped its attempts to shore up 
the banking system, and to stay on the gold standard. However, conflict between Germany 
and France had been brewing since the German government announced its plans to pursue a 
customs’ union with Austria. Lingering international tensions, one of the Versailles Treaty’s 
                                                 
12 At the height of the depression, unemployment benefits became means-tested.  
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repercussions, undermined any bid for multilateral support. In the end, the Reichsbank failed 
to rescue the banks and it had to suspend convertibility of the Mark into gold. 
 
C. The rise of the Nazi Party 
 
From relatively obscure beginnings in post-war Munich, the Nazi Party began to rise to a 
position of power and influence during the hyperinflation. In 1923, it made a violent bid for 
power, in the so-called Beerhall Putsch. After its bloody collapse, Nazi leaders were tried and 
sent to prison, Hitler most prominently among them; the party was declared illegal. 
Using his time in prison, Hitler wrote Mein Kampf (“My Struggle”), about his political 
vision and experiences so far. A growing number of prominent right-wing politicians beat a 
path to the door of his prison cell. After an early release from internment, Hitler returned to 
politics at the head of the newly-legalized party. While membership continued to grow, it had 
paltry success at the polls. In the Reichstag election in 1928, the Nazi Party received a mere 
2.6% of the vote. During Weimar’s “Golden Years”, this right-wing fringe party was 
languishing in obscurity.  
All of this changed after 1929. As the Great Depression took an ever greater hold in 
the German economy, politics turned acrimonious. The last democratically elected Chancellor 
Müller resigned in 1930, after a row over the rapidly rising cost of unemployment insurance. 
Thereafter, Chancellor Brüning governed without a parliamentary majority, supported by the 
emergency powers of President von Hindenburg.  
After its poor showing at the polls in 1928, the Nazi Party had changed its tune. Anti-
Semitism was toned down. It no longer advocated a violent overthrow of the established 
democratic order; instead, Hitler emphasized that only legal means would be used to come to 
power. As the party seemingly moved towards the political middle, it made itself acceptable 
to middle and upper classes. Hitler increasingly gave talks in front of gatherings of 
businessmen. In the September 1930 election, the Nazi Party scored its first big success, 
winning 18.3% of the vote. Between 1928 and 1930, the party had gained 4.6 million voters. 
Its success was in large part due to the agitation against the Young Plan, a rescheduling of 
Germany’s reparations obligations. While it lowered the annual payments, in exchange for a 
loan for abroad, it also lengthened the debt maturity. While the plebiscite against the 
ratification of the Young Plan was ultimately defeated, it provided a platform for the Nazis to 
argue that Germany was being enslaved for generations to come. 
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After the 1930 election, the ranks of the Nazi Party continued to grow, as did its 
streetfighting group of paramilitaries, the Sturmabteilung (SA). The worse the depression 
became, the more violent Weimar Germany’s politics was. Street fighting between the 
Communists, Nazis, and Republican paramilitaries became commonplace, especially in the 
large cities. The police frequently intervened, often with deadly results.  
The big electoral breakthrough of the Nazi Party came in March and July 1932, some 
9 to 12 months after the banking crisis. In two rounds, von Hindenburg defeated Hitler for 
President of the German Reich; the Nazi Party’s candidate polled 11 million votes in the first 
round and 13 million in the second. In the July 1932 election, the Nazi Party received 13.7 
million votes, its highest share in a fully democratic election. The Nazi Party had become the 
largest party in parliament, receiving more votes than the social democrats and communists 
combined. Fully confident of his claim to the chancellorship, Hitler negotiated his entry into 
the government – and failed to convince the aging President von Hindenburg. By November 
1932, in another round of elections, electoral support began to slip away from the Nazis. Their 
vote count fell by 2 million. By late 1932, many political commentators confidently predicted 
that the Nazis were on their way out.  
Barely a month later, after lobbying from arch-conservative advisors around him, 
President von Hindenburg finally appointed Hitler as Chancellor, in a cabinet where leading 
Nazi politicians were in a minority. Nonetheless, within two months, the Nazis had staged 
another set of (partially free) elections, and taken over effective power in all of the country.13 
 
III. Data and main variables 
 
A. Data 
 
This study uses various sources of data for interwar Germany, several of them collected and 
digitalized for the first time. 
The main hurdle is to establish the connection between firms and banks in a 
systematic way. Historical data on individual loans are unavailable. Another proxy for a bank-
firm connection is the lead bank in equity issuances for stock companies. Prospectuses on 
equity issuances would allow us to identify lead banks, but only infrequently and only for 
firms that issued equity in the years leading up to the banking crisis. Yet the lead bank does 
not only organize stock issuances, but also dividend payments. Each year, investors can 
                                                 
13 See Figure 3 for a comparison of the outcomes of the elections in 1930 and 1933 
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receive their dividends at the branches of the main bank for each stock company (so-called 
“Zahlstellen”). This information is provided in the “Handbook for German stock companies”, 
a yearly 4000-pages compendium of basic balance sheet information for each German stock 
company. We use yearbooks for 1929 and 1934 to collect firm-level data on bank connections 
and balance sheet items. 
We begin our analysis on the firm level. In a first step, we collect data on 5,251 firms 
that report total assets in 1929. We collect data on total assets, total capital, as well bank 
connections in 1929. For each firm, we record whether “Zahlstelle” lists Danatbank or 
Dresdner bank, or at least one of the other Great Berlin Banks (Deutsche Bank, 
Commerzbank, BHG). We then identify all firms reporting their wage bill in 1929 and 1934. 
For this sample we collect additional information on founding date, industry, city, as well as 
total wage bill in 1929 and 1934.14 We end up with a sample of 386 firms in 239 cities and 20 
industries. 59 firms list either Danatbank or Dresdner Bank as “Zahlstelle”, 63 firms list any 
of the other Great Banks, and 17 borrowed from Danat/Dresdner and at least one other 
Grossbank.15 For what follows, whenever we use the term “Danat” it will stand for Danatbank 
and Dresdner Bank unless explicitly stated otherwise. We also use the terms connected and 
borrowing interchangeably.  
In a second step, we move to the city level. We use the universe of listed firms in the 
1929 Handbook to collect data on city level exposure to Danat (explained in detail below). 
For 247 cities, we collect information on city population and unemployment from 1930 to 
1934 from the Statistical Yearbooks of German Cities (“Statistisches Jahrbuch deutscher 
Städte”), as well as total city labor force from the 1933 census. We gather data on major 
German federal elections in May 1928, September 1930, July 1932, November 1932, and 
March 1933. For each election, we record the number of votes for the different electable 
parties at the city level from Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (ICPSR 42). In addition, we 
collect information on destroyed and damaged synagogues (Alicke 2008) and deportations 
(Bundesarchiv). The 1925 census provides information on the share of blue-collar workers, 
Protestants, and Jews for each city.  
To shed light on the underlying mechanism and control for pre-existing trends, we 
also collect data on votes cast for anti-Semitic parties in elections at the end of the 19th and 
                                                 
14 While today data sources like Compustat provide easy access to comparable information across firms, 
historical handbook data does not. While for some firms we have information on the dividend-paying bank, 
assets, and wages, other firms provide none of this information. There are no filing requirements or any 
consistent form of balance sheet across firms. 
15  Firms that report a wage bill in 1929 can be missing in 1934 for several reasons: they do not report the wage 
bill anymore; they exited the market; they delisted; or they merged. Unfortunately, we can only verify the first of 
these points and thus analyze the intensive margin only. 
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beginning of the 20th century; whether a city had a pogrom in 1349; as well as information on 
whether a city is in a net-debtor or net-creditor area.16 In total, we end up with a sample of 
193 cities for which we have data on elections, unemployment, and exposure to Danat. Table 
A1 in the Appendix provides a comprehensive overview of variables used in our analysis and 
the sources of the data. 
 
B. Measures of bank-firm connections and city exposure 
 
In the first part of our analysis, we look at firms’ responses to the collapse of Danat. To 
measure a firm’s connection with a bank, we create two dummies. danat equals 1 if in 1929 a 
firm’s bank affiliation is Danatbank or Dresdner Bank, and zero otherwise; grossbank equals 
1 if the firm is connected to any of the other Great Banks. As dependent variable we use the 
growth in total wage bill from 1929 to 1934. As controls we use firm age and firm size (log of 
total assets). 
In the second part, we analyze the aggregate effects of a credit crunch and move to the 
city level. To study the effects of Danat’s failure and subsequent credit reduction on cities in 
Germany, we establish a measure of city exposure to these two banks. In each city, we sum 
across firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. Each firm is weighted by its reliance 
on external (bank) financing and its relative size in a city. In our main analysis, we proxy a 
firm’s external credit needs by a firm’s leverage ratio (defined as liabilities17 over capital). 
City c’s exposure to Danatbank is calculated as  
 
 
 is an indicator for whether firm f is located in city c. Each observation is then weighted by 
firm f’s share of assets in all firms’ assets of city c in our sample.  
Our main outcome variables are the change in the unemployment rate from 1930 to 
1933, and the change in NSDAP votes. In baseline specifications we define the 
unemployment rate as yearly unemployment over total labor force in 1933. For robustness, we 
also standardize unemployment by yearly population. The change in NSDAP votes is defined 
                                                 
16 The 1933 “Enquetekommission zur Untersuchung der Bankenkrise” published detailed information for 100 
local areas (called “Bankbezirke) on whether they had a surplus or deficit of deposits over loans in 1929. We 
categorize each city as debtor if it is located in an area with a deficit, and creditor if it is in an area with a 
surplus. In general, rural areas are creditors, and industrial areas debtors.  
17 Excluding capital 
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as the change in the share of votes from September 1930 to March 1933. To further measure 
radicalization, we define the dummy synagogues that takes value 1 if a synagogue was 
damaged or destroyed in a city after 1933; as well as total deportations from 1933-1945 over 
total Jewish population in 1933.  
We also measure city exposure to exports as an additional exogenous shock to 
unemployment. From 1929 to 1934, Germany’s total exports declined by almost 70% from 
13,486 billion Reichsmark to 4,178 billion Reichsmark.18 While most of the decline happened 
prior to 1932, the fall in export volume likely contributed to the increase in unemployment. 
To measure a city’s exposure to the decline in exports, we first aggregate firm assets to the 
city-industry level. We then match total industry exports in 1929, provided by the 
Statistisches Jahrbuch des dt. Reiches 1930, to each town-industry cell. Finally, we aggregate 
to the city level, where we weight each industry i by its share of assets in the respective city.19 
Thus, exposure of city c to industry exports is given by 
 
 
 
For our analysis, we define exports as log(1+exports). The assumption is that cities’ 
industrial structure is exogenous, or at least predetermined, to the causes of the recession. To 
further shed light on the mechanism connecting the banking crisis to unemployment, we 
define tradable and non-tradable industries as industries in the top and bottom tercile in terms 
of export shares. Similarly, we define cities as high exports and low exports cities if they are 
in the top and bottom tercile of variable exports. 
 
C. Descriptive statistics 
 
Our firm-level analysis compares firms affected by Danat’s failure with other firms. This 
comparison is only valid if the two groups of firms are otherwise similar after controlling for 
observables. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our main firm-level variables. To 
highlight the differences in firm characteristics across Danat and non-Danat borrowers, we 
split the sample into groups and report mean and standard deviation (sd) for each group. The 
first group comprises 59 firms that borrow from Danatbank or Dresdner Bank (Danat 
borrowers). The second group comprises the remaining 327 firms that do not borrow from 
                                                 
18 Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch III, 1978. 
19 We omit industries with less than 1 % of total exports. 
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Danatbank or Dresdner Bank (All other borrowers). The final group focuses on the 63 firms 
that do not borrow from Danat or Dresdner, but from at least one other large bank (grossbank 
borrowers). For the latter two groups we report t-values of differences in mean relative to the 
Danat sample. Comparing Danat and all other borrowers shows that the average Danat 
borrower is older and larger, but has a similar wage-to-asset ratio. Yet these differences are to 
be expected; firms connected to a large national bank are larger and more established. Once 
we compare Danat and Grossbank borrowers, all differences are statistically insignificant. In 
our regressions we will compare exposure to Danat and exposure to other Grossbanken. As 
the sample between both groups is balanced, this alleviates concerns about self-selection of 
firms and banks. 
Figure 4 shows that our firm sample is representative of the total population, and that 
Danat borrowers were not riskier prior to the crisis. Figure 4, panel A, compares the 
distribution of log assets for the sample of firms that report a wage bill in 1929 (386 
observations) and the universe of listed firms in 1929 (5,251 observations). While the full 
sample shows slightly more dispersion, both distributions are similar. This suggests that our 
sub-sample of firms reporting a wage bill is representative of the average listed firm and there 
is no significant sample selection. Panel B shows firm leverage, defined as liabilities over 
capital, for firms borrowing from Danat, a Grossbank, and from other banks, for the full 1929 
sample. While Danat and Grossbank borrowers are almost identical, firms that borrow neither 
from Danat or Dresdner, nor any other Grossbank, have higher leverage. As highly leveraged 
firms tend to perform worse during financial crises. Danat borrowers’ lower leverage 
reassures us that Danatbank did not systematically lend to riskier firms before the crisis. 
Finally, Figure 5, Panel A, shows the geographical distribution of firms connected to 
Danat. No region has a significant bias toward Danat firms or non-Danat firms, although 
northeast Germany has no Danat borrower in the wage bill sample. 
Similar to Table 1 on the firm level, Table 2 compares cities with positive Danat 
exposure to all remaining cities, and cities with positive Grossbank exposure. By construction, 
cities differ in their exposure, but cities more exposed to Danat are on average larger and have 
a lower share of blue-collar workers than cities with zero exposure. Danat cities also have a 
higher share of Jews, but the difference is less than 0.5 % in absolute terms. In terms of 1930 
unemployment rate, share of votes cast for NSDAP, as well as the share of Protestants, there 
are no significant differences. These differences and similarities persist when we limit the 
sample to cities with positive exposure to Grossbanken, although differences narrow. 
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Figure 6 shows the distribution of city exposure to Danat borrowers. 84 firms have 
zero exposure, while mean (median) exposure equals 0.08 (0.03), and the standard deviation 
equals 0.12. Figure 5, Panel B, shows the geographical distribution of cities with exposure to 
Danat-firms. Cities with and without exposure are evenly distributed across Germany. Figure 
7, Panel A, ranks industries by export shares (defined as industry exports over total exports). 
Industries with highest export shares are clothing (textile, silk, shoes, and apparel), trade 
(trading companies, department stores, and konsumvereine), and metal (equipment, aviation, 
cars, ships). Panel B shows the distribution of city log(exports). Six cities have zero trade 
exposure, mean (median, sd) log trade exposure equals 6.17 (6.52, 1.57). The correlation 
between city exposure to Danat and log(exports) is 0.13. We now lay out our empirical 
strategy and then present results. 
 
IV. Empirical strategy 
 
At the firm level, we model the effect of Danat’s collapse on firms’ wage bill as: 
 
 
 
 is the change in firm f’s total wage bill between 1930 and 1933. The main right hand 
side variable is , which is a dummy that equals 1 if firm f is connected to Danat or 
Dresdner in 1929 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient vector ( ) estimates the effects on firm-
specific control variables, collected in vector . Controls are a firm’s log total assets, firm 
age, and whether a firm was connected to another Great Bank. We expect that a contraction in 
loan supply by Danat leads to a decline in firms’ wage bill if they borrow from Danat, so 
 We cluster standard errors at the city level. 
Our research design relies on three main assumptions. First, the German banking crisis 
was exogenous to borrower characteristics and loan demand. Second, firms’ connections to 
banks were sticky and firms’ options to obtain credit from other sources were limited. Third, 
to link the failing banks to cities, we assume that firm-bank connections at the city level are a 
good proxy of a city’s exposure to the banking crisis. We discuss each assumption in turn. 
Banking crises and recessions often go hand in hand and it is difficult to establish 
causality (Reinhard and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor 2012). If some banks lend to 
riskier firms, deteriorating firm performance and bank failures coincide (Kiyotaki and Moore 
1997; Khwaja and Mian 2008; Jimenez et al 2012). Disentangling changes in banks’ loan 
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supply from changes in firms’ loan demand thus poses a major identification challenge. The 
German Banking crisis offers a unique setting to address these issues. First, the reduction in 
credit by Danatbank and Dresdner Bank was exogenous to all but one single firm in Germany. 
Nordwolle, a large textile company, had been expanding at a rapid rate during the latter part 
of the 1920’s. Their stocks were rising, and Danatbank and Dresdner Bank were not hesitant 
to lend ever larger sums. In 1931, Danat had a sizeable loan to Nordwolle outstanding, equal 
to 80 percent of Danat’s equity. In May 1931, Danatbank discovered that Nordwolle had 
forged their books and a large bet against wool prices delivered large losses to Nordwolle. 
When news broke in June of the same year, investors saw that the failure of Nordwolle was 
imminent. Already thinly capitalized, Danat’s equity was in peril and things were equally dire 
at Dresdner Bank. As both banks faced the thread of an insurmountable loss, depositors 
started to run. Danatbank and Dresdner Bank saw massive outflows from domestic and 
foreign depositors.  
On July 12, Danatbank’s liquidity was depleted and it could no longer open its 
branches. The national bank holidays imposed by the government did not ease the problems 
and Danatbank’s and Dresdner Bank’s businesses experienced a major disruption. As Figure 8 
shows, loan supply to their borrowers decreased substantially. Crucially for identification, this 
shift in loan supply was unanticipated: similar to Enron in the 2000s, the sudden discovery of 
accounting fraud had unanticipated negative consequences. The unexpected default of a local 
borrower, Nordwolle, ultimately led to the failure of Danatbank and near-failure of Dresdner 
Bank, and thereby affected firms all over Germany.  
Even if a shock that leads to a banking crisis is exogenous to firms’ loan demand, 
swift government intervention often disrupts demand and supply simultaneously in the 
immediate aftermath of a banking failure. Yet neither the German government nor the central 
bank interfered in a substantial way. The government’s fiscal position was too weak to save a 
bank. The central bank’s gold reserves were at historic lows and liquidity provision was not 
an option. This resulted in a prolonged crisis; it took over one year to merge Danatbank and 
Dresdner as a minimal response to the crisis. 
With government help unavailable and bank lending distressed, firms often turn to 
alternative sources of funding. However, the German economy was based on close-knit ties 
between banks and firms. Bank directors often sat on a firm’s supervisory board and banks 
held a substantial equity stake in connected companies. As a result, switching costs were often 
prohibitive, making firms’ bank relationships sticky. On top, other banks in the German 
economy also experienced deposit withdrawals, although to a lesser extent. Given the overall 
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economic conditions in 1931, other banks would have had difficulties to meet a sudden 
increase in credit demand from firms leaving Danat or Dresdner. 
A second challenge is to establish a clear linkage between banks and the real 
economy. During the Great Depression in the US, banks only operated in often disjoint local 
markets. This makes it difficult to compare the performance of borrowers of a failed bank 
with nearby borrowers of a different bank. In contrast, the largest banks in Germany operated 
on a national scale. Deposits were taken across all regions, and lending was done in major 
cities and smaller towns across the country. This allows us to compare firms that depended on 
Danatbank or Dresdner Bank with other firms in other areas, while controlling for 
heterogeneity at the local level. 
Did bank failures help to radicalize voters? To address this question, we aggregate 
firm connections to the city level. Our main specification at the city level is: 
 
 
 
 is a an outcome variable such as the change in unemployment or votes for the NSDAP in 
city c.  is our main explanatory variable of interest; it is city c’s exposure to 
Danatbank’s failure, calculated from firm-level data. To further control for confounding 
factors we include a city’s longitude and latitude, its log population in 1930, as well as its 
Protestants, Jews, and blue-collar workers in 1925, all as share of its total population. In some 
regressions we will also control for city exposure to other Grossbanken, as well as its 
exposure to exports. Standard errors are cluster-robust. We expect that cities with a higher 
exposure to Danat-borrowing firms see a stronger contraction in bank lending and thus an 
increase in unemployment and votes for the NSDAP. That is, .  
This specification relies on two main assumptions. First, cities with more firms 
connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank are more affected by the failure of those banks 
than other cities. Second, bank failures have a larger impact on a city if connected firms are 
larger or have a higher need for external financing. 
When firms lay off workers or cut their wages as a result of a banking crisis, local 
economies suffer. Suffering worsens as the number of affected firms grows. Our sample of 
firms covers the universe of listed firms in 1929 and thus represents a significant share of a 
city’s economy. The average city has 30 listed firms. All firms are stock companies and 
therefore represent the largest firms of the German economy. So while the number of firms 
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may be low for some cities, it is a sensible assumption that our firm sample represents a 
significant part of each city’s labor market. 
To measure a city’s exposure, we focus on banks’ assets side—the impact of changes 
in lending on firms in a given city. Yet it is not only the sheer number of firms that makes a 
city suffer, but also how important connected firms are for the local economy and how they 
can cope with a loss in credit. We take this into account by weighting firms by their size and 
their external financing needs. 
In alternative specifications, we run panel regressions of the following form 
 
 
 
Outcome variables are the unemployment rate or number of firms in city c in year t. We 
interact city exposure with log loan volume of Danat and Dresdner over time. As controls, we 
include log city population. The panel specification allows us to control for common shocks 
through time fixed effects, as well as unobservable city characteristics through city fixed 
effects. A decline in loan volume should lead to a stronger increase in unemployment if a city 
has higher exposure to Danat. The next section presents our main results. 
 
V. Main results 
 
A. Firm-level results 
 
This section presents results for firm-level regression equation (3). Table 3 shows that firms 
that borrowed from Danat see a significantly stronger decline in their total wage bill. In 
column (1), Danat borrowers’ wage bill falls by 25 % more compared to firms that do not 
have connections with Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. The coefficient is significant at the 1% 
level. Column (2) adds firm characteristics to control for the fact that Danat borrowers are on 
average larger and older. After controlling for firm size and age, as well as connections to 
other large banks, Danat borrowers still have significantly lower wage bill growth (-20.4 %). 
The coefficient on grossbank, a dummy indicating whether a firm borrows from any other 
large bank besides Danat or Dresdner, is negative, but insignificant. As we showed in section 
XX, firms borrowing from Danat or other Grossbanken are similar in terms of size, age, and 
leverage. The insignificant coefficient on grossbank reassures us that we capture loan supply 
effects induced by Danat’s failure. 
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Columns (3)-(7) introduce different fixed effects to control for unobservables. Column 
(3) introduces firm size-bin fixed effects, where we create quintiles based on firm size. As 
Danat borrowers are larger, regressions with size-bin fixed effects effectively compare firms 
with similar size. Column (4) employs industry fixed effects for 20 distinct industries to 
absorb any unobservable characteristics that affect all firms within an industry, for example 
changes in exports. In both specifications, the coefficient on danat remains significantly 
negative. Wage growth is 19.5 % and 15.8 % lower for Danat borrowers.  
Column (4) introduces city fixed effects. This leads to a decline in sample size, as 
some cities in our sample report only one firm with wage bill. Column (5) repeats our baseline 
specification without city fixed effects for the smaller sample.  Borrowing from Danat leads to 
a similar effect on wage bill growth as in our baseline specification with the larger sample in 
column (2) (-23.4 % vs -20.4 %). Once we introduce city fixed effect to control for common 
citywide shocks, the coefficient increases by around one third (column (6)). Comparing two 
firms within the same city, borrowing from Danat decreases wage bill growth by 32.3 % in 
relative terms. Note that the coefficient on grossbank turns positive now, but remains 
insignificant. Finally, column (7) jointly uses city, industry, and size fixed effects. The size of 
the coefficient on danat remains stable and similar to results without fixed effects in columns 
(1) and (2). It is now less precisely estimated, yet still significant at the 10 % level. The loss in 
significance is likely due to the demanding fixed effect structure, which leaves little variation. 
Overall, results in Table 3 show a strong negative effect of connections to Danatbank on 
firms’ wage bill growth.  
In the next section, we will show that the negative effects of Danatbank’s collapse on 
firms also lead to higher citywide unemployment. However, before we turn to city level 
regressions, we first show that changes in firms’ wage bill map into city unemployment. For 
each city, we compute the total change in wage bill from 1929 to 1933. Figure 9, panel A, 
shows that cities with higher exposure, i.e. a higher share of firms borrowing from Danat, 
have a stronger decline in total wage bill. Panel B, in turn, shows that cities with a smaller 
decline in their wage bill also see a smaller rise in unemployment from 1930 to 1933. Table 4 
confirms these findings with regressions for the 81 cities for which we have wage bill data 
and unemployment data.20 Columns (1)-(2) show that higher exposure leads to lower wage 
bill growth, columns (3)-(4) report that higher wage bill growth is correlated with a smaller 
                                                 
20 When we collect data on all listed firms, we restrict our data-gathering to cities that report unemployment 
values. Instead, for the wage bill sample of firms, we impose no restriction on the set of cities. In consequence, 
the overlap of cities that report unemployment and firms with wage bill values equals 81, 
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increase in unemployment. All regressions use robust standard errors, columns (2) and (4) the 
full set of city controls.  
 
B. City-level results 
 
We now show that firms’ reactions to the banking crisis had significant effects on local 
economies. We analyze how unemployment responded at the city level and how voting 
patterns became more radicalized in cities hit by Danatbank’s failure. 
Danat's failure and the subsequent credit crunch for related firms led to a significant 
increase in unemployment. Table 5 provides the results of a regression of the change in the 
unemployment rate between 1930 and 1933 on a city's exposure to Danatbank. The difference 
between a city with no exposure to Danatbank and a city with average exposure (0.15) was an 
additional increase in unemployment by 1.37%. The effect is slightly smaller when 
controlling for city size (column 2) or heterogeneity between regions (column 3). Focusing on 
cities with positive exposure, a one standard deviation increase in exposure led to an 
additional 0.65% increase in unemployment (column 4).21 
More exposed cities not only saw their unemployment rate rise relatively more (or 
decline slower), but they also experienced a stronger move of their voters to the extreme right. 
Figure 11 plots the distribution of changes in vote shares for the NSDAP between the 
elections in 1930 and 1933. Cities are divided whether they have zero (“low”) or positive 
(“high”) exposure to Danat. Cities with high exposure to Danatbank saw on average larger 
gains for the Nazis in the election in 1933 compared to the election in March 1930. 
Table 6 confirms these findings. The table reports regression results for the change in 
the NSDAP's share of the electoral vote between 1930 and 1933 on a city’s exposure to 
Danat. When not controlling for covariates, estimates are not precise enough. Yet when we 
control for city characteristics, a city with average exposure is associated with an additional 
gain of 1.15% for the NSDAP in the 1933 election relative to a city with no exposure (column 
2). The effect strengthens when heterogeneity between regions is taken into account (column 
3). Note that the effect of exposure on unemployment and Nazi votes are close. In terms of 
standard deviations, a one standard deviation increase in exposure increases the change in 
unemployment by 0.172 standard deviations, the change in NSDAP votes by 0.168 standard 
deviations. 
                                                 
21 For a graphical representation of the results, see Figure 10 
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Columns (4) to (6) look at the effect of a city's exposure to Danatbank on the 
likelihood that the NSDAP won the majority in the 1933 election. Being exposed to Danat 
(with exposure equal to 0.15) increases the probability of a Nazi win by around 6.5% (column 
5 and 6). 
 
C. Mechanism 
 
A popular explanation for voter radicalization is that an increase in discontent drives voters to 
the extremes—with unemployment as a large factor for dissatisfaction. However, studies on 
the Weimar Republic do not find conclusive evidence of a significant relationship between 
unemployment and voting for the NSDAP. While unemployment meant hardship for millions 
of Germans, it did not trigger directly a movement of voters to the extreme right. The banking 
crisis changed that. It provided an “easy” explanation for everyone's job loss and a scapegoat: 
The crisis was triggered by a bank with a prominent Jewish CEO. Nazis exploited this 
message and for parts of the society it became more acceptable to vote for Hitler.  
Table 7 provides evidence for this mechanism. Column (1) confirms that 
unemployment and voting for the NSDAP are not significantly related. However, the part of 
unemployment explained by the banking crisis is associated with significantly larger voter 
movement to the extreme right. Column (2) uses the predicted unemployment from the 
previous regression of the change in unemployment on Danatbank exposure as independent 
variable. An increase in unemployment due to Danat's failure relates almost one-to-one to an 
increase in voting for the NSDAP. Residual unemployment is unable to explain a significant 
increase in Nazi voting (column 3). When using a horserace between predicted unemployment 
and its residual, the crisis-related increase in unemployment leads to a significant increase in 
gains for the NSDAP (column (4)).  
Blaming Jews for the banking crisis may have been easier in some cities than in 
others. Table 8 looks at the heterogeneous response of voters to the banking crisis depending 
on a cities' existing (hostile) stance toward Jews. Prejudices toward Jews can persist for a 
(very) long time (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). A voter with an existing negative perception of 
Jews is more likely to follow the Nazis' siren calls.  
Columns (1) and (2) divide the sample based on a cities' existing anti-Semitism, 
proxied by election outcomes at the end of the 19th century. While less anti-Semitic cites did 
not see a significant increase in Nazi voting due to Danat's failure, cities with high anti-
Semitism and high exposure to Danat voted significantly more for the NSDAP. The effect of 
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Danat exposure is almost twice as large as in the baseline specification. This finding persists 
when we use a different measure of a city's latent anti-Semitism, the existence of pogroms in 
1349. Voters in cities that had experienced pogroms against Jews over 600 years ago could be 
more easily convinced that Jakob Goldschmidt was to blame for their unemployment (column 
(3)-(4)). 
The results so far suggest that the credit channel is important for unemployment and 
voter radicalization. Yet bank failures may have also radicalized voters in their role as 
depositors. Although depositors did not lose their savings, the long lines during the bank runs 
in 1931 were fresh on peoples' minds when they went to the polls in 1933. Columns (5) and 
(6) use a measure of how large a city's depository base was relative to the loans made in a 
given city. If a city had more deposits than outstanding bank loans in 1929, it is labelled as 
creditor, and if the opposite was true as debtor. The results suggest that the effect of the 
banking crisis on depositors amplified the effect of the bank-lending channel on extreme 
voting. 
These results show that pre-existing anti-Semitism mixed with the experience of the 
banking crisis gave the Nazis an electoral advantage. But did the banking crisis intensify anti-
Semitism? To investigate this question, we use data on inter-racial marriages between Jews 
and non-Jews. Table 9 provides the results for a difference-differences specification, where 
we regress monthly data on the log number of interracial marriages in a city on an interaction 
term whether the city was exposed to Danat’s failure and whether the month was after July 
1931. Columns (1) and (2) support our explanation that the banking crisis increased anti-
Semitism. Cities more exposed to the bank failures experienced a significant shift in inter-
racial marriages—such marriages declined by 11% compared to pre-crisis times. This effect is 
not driven by an overall decrease in the frequency of Jews to marry. Columns (3) and (4) use 
the log number of Jewish marriages as a placebo test. Cities exposed to the crisis did not see a 
significant change in Jewish marriages. 
In an alternative explanation of our findings, negative trade shocks led to 
unemployment and voter radicalization. Cities with higher exports most likely have larger 
firms. If firms related to Danatbank also suffered from decreased foreign demand, our 
regressions may exhibit unobserved variable bias. To control for this alternative mechanism, 
Table 10 includes a city's log exports in 1929 as a measure of a city's exposure to the large 
decline in international trade. Columns (1) and (2) show that cities more exposure to trade did 
see a larger increase in unemployment. However, those cities did not experience a significant 
radicalization of voters (columns (3)-(4)). When including a city's exposure to Danatbank and 
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to trade shocks, both are positively associated with unemployment. Yet only the exposure to 
Danatbank explains a significant part of voting for the Nazis. Further, while unemployment 
predicted by a city’s exposure to Danat can explain the change in NSDAP votes, 
unemployment predicted by a city’s exposure to trade shocks cannot (Table 11). 
The preceding results suggest that the banking crisis intensified pre-existing anti-
Semitism in certain cities. Yet to a somewhat lesser extent, voter radicalization also occurred 
in cities where the Nazis had a harder time blaming Jewish bankers. Table 12 reports our 
baseline regression, using the 1930-1933 change in the vote share of the communist party, the 
KPD, as the dependent variable. As for Nazi votes, cities with a higher exposure to Danatbank 
saw a larger increase in voting for the communists (columns 1 and 2). In contrast to the 
NSDAP, the KPD largely won votes in cites with high exposure to Danat, but relatively lower 
anti-Semitic sentiment (columns 3 to 6).  
Table 13 moves to the relationship between unemployment and communist voting. 
Column (1) shows that unemployment is not a significant predictor of radical voting on 
neither side of the aisle—not only is it unrelated to Nazi voting, but also to voting for the 
KPD. Yet as before, the part of unemployment predicted by Danat's failure is positively and 
significantly associated with the communists' gains in the 1933 elections (column 2). The 
residual part of unemployment cannot explain variation in KPD voting (column 3), and in a 
joint regression only the banking-crisis induced part of unemployment is important for radical 
voting on the left (column 4). 
 
D. Aftermath 
 
In 1933, voters put the NSDAP into power in what would be the last (mostly) free nation-wise 
election in Germany until the 1950s. Voters' behavior was partly driven by the results of the 
banking crisis, which Nazis squarely blamed on Jews. In cities hit by the banking crisis, 
hostility toward Jews did not end with the election; it took several turns for the worse. Table 
14 shows that the anti-Semitic sentiment triggered by the banking crisis had dire 
consequences even years after Danat's failure. Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the 
probability of a damaged or destroyed synagogue during the 1938 pogrom is significantly 
greater if a city had more exposure to Danatbank. Further, these cities deported a significantly 
higher share of Jews during the Holocaust (columns (5)-(6)). 
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VI. Robustness 
 
A. Firm-level 
 
This section reports robustness checks for firm-level regression equation (3). To get a better 
sense which part of the wage bill distribution is driving our results, Table 15 runs quantile 
regressions with wage bill growth as dependent variable. Across the distribution, firms with 
Danat connections have lower wage bill growth. In each column, connections to Danat reduce 
firm wage bill growth. The effect is particularly strong and significant at the tails of the 
distribution (columns (1) and (7)). All regressions control for firm size and age and use robust 
standard errors.  
While the collapse of Nordwolle triggered the decline of Danatbank, other major 
events happened contemporaneously. Shortly before the failure of Danatbank, Austrian bank 
Credit-Anstalt declared bankruptcy on May 11, 1931. While Credit-Anstalt primarily served 
the Austrian and Eastern European market, contagion effects could nonetheless affect our 
results. To ensure that our coefficient is not picking up the negative effects of Credit-Anstalt’s 
bankruptcy, we exclude all firms close to the Austrian border (63 observations). Table 16, 
column (2) shows that the coefficient on Danat changes only marginally (column (1) shows 
the baseline coefficient for comparison). Another potential source of bias is Nordwolle’s 
collapse. Danat’s main borrower employed around 20,000 workers, making it one of the 
major employees in the Bremen area. In column (3) we thus exclude all firms in a 50 km 
radius around Bremen to avoid that spillover effects of Nordwolle’s bankruptcy on firms in 
the vicinity drive our results. The coefficient declines by around 8 % in magnitude compared 
to column (1). However, borrowing from Danat still leads to a significant decline in total 
wage bill by 18.8 %. Finally, we exclude firms in Germany’s industrial heartland, the 
Ruhrgebiet. The Ruhr area contains industries producing raw materials and metals, which 
were hard-hit during the collapse in export volume. Excluding firms in the Ruhr area (54 
observations) does not change the coefficient. 
Table 17 and Figure 12 show that our estimation is robust to different levels of 
clustering as well as excluding individual cities. Each column in Table 17 clusters on a 
different level. Column (1) replicates our baseline regression with clustered standard errors on 
the city level. Column (2)-(5) use robust standard errors, or standard errors clustered on 
industry level, 40 firm size bins, as well as two-way on the city and industry level. Robust 
standard errors are the most conservative method, while higher levels of clustering increase 
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the precision of our estimates. Panel A of Figure 12 plots coefficient and t-value for 
regression equation (3), where we exclude each of our 386 firms one-by-one. Coefficients and 
t-values are stable across the range of firms, so no individual firm is driving our results. 
Finally, we run regression equation (3) for each main industry in our sample separately. Main 
industries are required to have at least 20 firms. Panel B of Figure 12 plots coefficients and 90 
% confidence intervals on danat for the seven main industries. Except for clothing, it is 
negative and of similar magnitude in all industries.  
 
B. City-level 
 
This section shows that the results of Danatbank’s failure on unemployment are robust to 
alternative specifications. We use a different measure for unemployment and use quantile 
regressions as alternative specifications. Panel regressions further confirm our findings. The 
same tests are employed to check robustness of our voting results. 
Our baseline specification normalizes the number of unemployed in 1930 and 1933 by 
city population in 1933. This normalization potentially underestimates the unemployment rate 
in 1930 for a city with relatively higher growth between 1930 and 1933. If a growing city is 
associated with larger firms related to Danat, our results could be biased. To alleviate this 
concern, Table 18 shows that the results are robust to using an alternative measure of 
unemployment, where the number of unemployed is normalized by a city's current population. 
Coefficients are similar in sign and significance, albeit smaller in magnitude, as total 
population is greater than total labor force. 
To show that our results are robust to outliers and possible non-linearities, Table 19 
reports quantile regressions of unemployment on a city’s exposure to Danatbank. Except for 
the 25th percentile, point estimates are similar to the OLS point estimates. 
Our initial results are based on several cross-sectional regressions. As an alternative, 
panel regressions allow to control for heterogeneity across cities as well as common time 
trends. We interact Danat exposure with dummies for the years from 1931 to 1935 and regress 
yearly unemployment on these interactions. Year 1930 is the omitted category and constitutes 
the base year. Figure 13 plots the estimated coefficients on interaction terms. The figure 
shows that our results are not driven by pre-existing trends toward growing unemployment in 
cities with high exposure. Danat’s collapse has the strongest effect on unemployment in 1933 
and is still significant 1934. The effect disappears in 1935. 
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Table 20 turns to the effect of a city’s exposure to Danat on voting for the NSDAP 
without assuming a linear relationship. The table reports quantile regressions. As for 
unemployment, the coefficients are relatively stable across the different specifications, with 
the strongest effect occurring for the cities with the highest exposure. 
In our main specifications, exposure of a city to Danatbank does not vary over time. 
Does this measure truly capture the effects of the 1931 banking crisis or does it simply proxy 
other measures of persistent anti-Semitism or a city’s propensity to vote extreme? To address 
this concern, we perform a placebo test using election results from before the banking crisis. 
Table 21 provides the results of regressions with the change in votes for the NSDAP between 
the elections in 1928 and 1930 as the dependent variable. While exposure to Danat is 
positively associated with increased Nazi voting after 1930, this relationship does not hold for 
elections right before the banking crisis. 
Building on this exercise, Figure 14 shows that the banking crisis was the defining 
moment that changed the relationship between a city’s exposure to Danatbank and NSDAP 
voting. The figure plots the coefficients from regressions of exposure on changes in the vote 
share of NSDAP. While there was no effect of higher exposure to Danat borrowers on 
NSDAP votes from 1928 to 1930, there is a significant positive effect from 1930 to later 
elections in 1932 and 1933. Exposure to Danatbank only becomes a positive and significant 
predictor of extreme voting once a city got hit by the banking crisis. Panels A in Figure 13 
and Figure 14 show that our results are robust to excluding individual cities. Coefficients and 
t-values of exposure on unemployment or NSDAP votes remain stable if we drop cities one-
by-one.  
Finally, Table 22 shows that the effect of exposure to Danat on unemployment is 
stronger in cities with non-tradable industries. Columns (1)-(2) are on the firm level. We 
classify firms as tradable if they belong to an industry in the top tercile in terms of exports, 
and non-tradable if they belong to the bottom tercile. While borrowing from Danat leads to 
lower wage bill growth, the interaction effect is positive. Firms in non-tradable industries 
suffer more from a reduction in loan supply, although the effect is insignificant. Columns (3)-
(4) move to the aggregate city level. We assign cities the dummy high exports with value 1 if 
its log(exports), as defined in equation (2), are in the top tercile of the distribution, and 0 if 
they are in the bottom tercile. If there are local spillover effects, we expect that cities with a 
strong non-tradable sector (low export cities) are harder hit by Danat’s default. The direct 
effect on connected firms is compounded by spillover effects to firms that depend on local 
demand by Danat borrowers. In line with this hypothesis, we find a significant negative effect 
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on the interaction effect of Danat exposure and the high export dummy. Cities with high 
exports suffer much less from a decline in loan supply to Danat-connected firms, as local 
spillover effects are less important.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This paper documents three main empirical facts. First, we show that firms that were 
connected to Danatbank – Germany’s second-largest bank in 1929 – suffered more when it 
collapsed. In particular, we show that employment and wages declined more sharply in firms 
that had previously paid their dividend through offices of Danat, which we argue is a reliable 
indicator of firm-bank linkages.  
Second, we show that distress originating in the financial sector led to increases in 
aggregate unemployment, and the more so in locations with stronger links to banks’ in 
distress. We create a measure of city-level exposure to Danat and demonstrate that 
unemployment surged more where larger and more numerous firms were exposed to its 
collapse.  
Third, economic distress induced by the banking collapse provided a major boost to 
the electoral fortunes of the Nazi Party. Unemployment changes after 1930 in Germany as a 
whole have no predictive power for radical voting – but in towns and cities affected by 
Danat’s collapse, this is radically different. We also offer evidence that these effects were 
sharper where the Nazis could tap into pre-existing anti-Semitic sentiment. Finally, we 
demonstrate that the severity of local persecution of Jews after 1933 was greater where 
Danat’s bankruptcy had caused the greatest economic harm.  
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Figures and tables 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Bank loans, firm wages, and Nazi votes 
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Note: Panel A shows change in total bank loans from 1931 to 1933 by bank group. Panel B 
shows average change in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933 for firms not connected (No Danat 
Borrower) and connected (Danat Borrower) to Danatbank. Panel C shows change in NSDAP 
vote shares from 1930 to 1933 for cities with zero (low) vs positive (high) exposure to Danat 
borrowers. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Industrial production 1929-1934 
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Note: Index of industrial production for selected countries, standardized to 100 in 1929 for all 
countries. Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1937. 
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Figure 3: NSDAP election outcomes 
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Note: Panel A shows change in share of total votes for selected parties in 09/1930 ad 03/1933 
elections. Panel B shows percentage of cities in which party won majority of votes for the 
same election dates. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Firm assets and leverage 
         Panel A: Firm assets      Panel B: Firm leverage 
0
.1
.2
.3
de
ns
ity
8 10 12 14 16 18
log(firm assets 1929)
wage sample
full sample
0
.2
.4
.6
de
ns
ity
0 2 4 6 8
leverage 1929
other borrowers
Danat borrower
GB borrower
 
Note: Panel A shows distribution of log assets for wage bill sample of firms, as well as for full 
sample of firms in 1929. Panel B shows firm leverage (defined as total liabilities over capital) 
for the full 1929 sample of firms, split into Danat, Grossbank, and other borrowers. 
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Figure 5: Geographical distribution of Danat borrowers 
 
Panel A: Firm level 
 
 
 
Panel B: City level 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Panel A shows geographical distribution of firms with and without Danat connection, 
Panel B distribution of cities with positive and zero Danat exposure. Red dots indicate 
firms/cities with Danat exposure, grey diamonds those with no Danat connection. 
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Figure 6: City exposure to Danat borrowers 
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Note: city exposure denotes cities’ exposure to Danat-connected borrowers in 1929 as defined 
in equation (1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Industry exports and town export exposure 
Panel A: Industry export shares        Panel B: Town exports 
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 Note: Panel A ranks industries by export share out of total exports in 1929 (industries with 
export share > 1 %  only), panel B shows the distribution of city log export exposure as 
defined in equation (2). 
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Figure 8: Bank loan growth 1929-1933 
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Note: Change in log total loan volume for selected banks, standardized to 1 in 1930. 
Danatbank and Dresdner Bank denote aggregate loan volume for both banks. Source: 
Handbuch deutscher Aktiengesellschaften 1934. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Exposure, wage bill, and unemployment 
Panel A: Wages and exposure            Panel B: Unemployment and wages  
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Note: Panel A shows binscatter plot of total change in city wage bill vs city exposure to Danat 
borrowers. Panel B shows binscatter plot of city change in unemployment (UE) against total 
city wage bill growth. 
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Figure 10: City exposure and unemployment 1930-1933 
Panel A: Density                           Panel B: Binscatter 
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Note: Panel A show density of change in unemployment rate from 1930 to 1933 for cities 
with positive (high) and zero (low) exposure to Danat connected firms. Panel B is a binscatter 
plot of change in unemployment against exposure. 
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Figure 11: Change in NSDAP vote 1930/09 to 1933/93 
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Note: Change in NSDAP share of votes from September 1930 election to March 1933 
election. Panel A: Low exposure are cities with no exposure to Danat borrowers, High 
exposure those with positive exposure. Panel B: binscatter against city exposure to Danat 
borrowers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Firm level stability of coefficient and selected industries 
Panel A: Stability of coefficient           Panel B: Selected industries 
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Note: Panel A plots coefficient and t-value of coefficient on danat in regression equation (3) 
on the y-axis. Dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933. The x-axis 
ranks firms according to their impact on the coefficient, from highest to lowest. All 
regressions include controls grossbank, firm age, and log(assets). Standard errors clustered on 
the city level. Panel B plots coefficient and 90 % confidence intervals of coefficient on danat 
in regression equation (3) on the y-axis, for the seven main industries in our sample. The 
average main industry has 35 firms. Dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from 1929 
to 1933. The x-axis lists each industry. All regressions include controls grossbank, firm age, 
and log(assets). Standard errors clustered on the city level. 
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Figure 13: City level stability of coefficient and effect over time, unemployment 
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Note: Panel A plots coefficient and t-value of coefficient on exposure in regression equation 
(4) on the y-axis. Dependent variable is change in city unemployment rate 1930 to 1933. The 
x-axis ranks cities according to their impact on the coefficient, from highest to lowest. All 
regressions include standard city controls and robust standard errors. Panel B plots coefficient 
and 90 % confidence interval of a panel regression of city unemployment rate on exposure 
interacted with yearly dummies (all relative to 1930 unemployment rate). Unemployment 
standardized by labor force on left axis, standardized by yearly city population on right axis. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: City level stability of coefficient and other elections, voting 
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Panel A: Stability of coefficient               Panel B: Effect over time 
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Note: Panel A plots coefficient and t-value of coefficient on exposure in regression equation 
(4) on the y-axis. Dependent variable is change in city NSDAP votes 1930 to 1933. The x-
axis ranks cities according to their impact on the coefficient, from highest to lowest. All 
regressions include standard city controls and robust standard errors. Panel B plots 
coefficients and 90 % confidence interval for different elections. 1930/09 denotes change in 
votes from 1928/5 to 1930/09, the remaining dates the change from 1930/09 election to the 
respective election. 
 
Table 1: Firm level summary statistics 
 
  
  
Danat 
borrowers 
 
  All other borrowers 
 
  Grossbank borrowers 
 
    mean sd   mean sd t   mean sd t 
firm age  40.90 (36.67)  27.81 (26.08) -3.31  45.06 (36.27) 0.63 
log assets  14.78 (1.34)  13.68 (1.34) -5.80  14.51 (1.36) -1.10 
log wages  13.15 (1.66)  12.09 (1.65) -4.52  13.15 (1.63) -0.44 
wage-asset 
ratio   0.31 (0.26)   0.35 (0.54) 0.62   0.32 (0.24) 0.30 
Observations   59     327   386   63   122 
 Note: Danat borrowers are firms borrowing only from Danat or Dresdner. All other 
borrowers are firms not borrowing from Danat and Dresdner. Grossbank borrowers are firms 
borrowing from any great bank other than Danat or Dresdner. sd denotes standard deviation, t 
the t-value of the difference in mean of the respective group relative to Danat borrowers. 
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Table 2: City level summary statistics 
 
  
Danat 
exposure 
 no Danat exposure  Grossbank exposure 
  mean sd   mean sd t   mean sd t 
exposure 0.15 (0.12)  0.00 (0.00) -10.97  0.00 (0.00) -6.86 
unemp. rate 1930 0.06 (0.02)  0.06 (0.02) -0.57  0.06 (0.02) -0.83 
NSDAP votes 09-
1930 0.19 (0.06)  0.19 (0.08) 0.29  0.19 (0.07) -0.12 
log population 1930 4.39 (0.99)  3.56 (0.46) -7.15  3.80 (0.55) -3.27 
share blue collar 0.40 (0.08)  0.45 (0.10) 3.90  0.43 (0.10) 1.83 
share jewish 0.01 (0.01)  0.01 (0.00) -4.47  0.01 (0.01) -2.72 
share protestant 0.65 (0.29)  0.68 (0.29) 0.86  0.71 (0.27) 1.08 
Observations 109     84   193   33   142 
 
Note: Danat exposure are cities with positive exposure to Danat-connected firms. No Danat 
exposure are cities with zero exposure to Danat-connected firms. Grossbank exposure are 
cities with zero exposure to Danat-connected firms, but positive exposure to any other 
Grossbank. Sd denotes standard deviation, t the t-value of the difference in mean of the 
respective group relative to Danat borrowers. 
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Table 3: Firm wage bill and Danat connection 
 
Dependent variable is firm wage bill growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
     city sample city sample  
                
danat -0.250*** -0.204*** -0.195*** -0.158*** -0.234*** -0.323*** -0.251* 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.076) (0.118) (0.144) 
grossbank  -0.074 -0.063 -0.069 -0.024 0.077 0.054 
  (0.100) (0.102) (0.104) (0.135) (0.107) (0.130) 
firm age  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
log(assets)  -0.021 -0.026 -0.030 -0.024 -0.022 -0.007 
  (0.025) (0.061) (0.026) (0.036) (0.038) (0.066) 
        
Observations 386 386 386 384 197 197 194 
R-squared 0.014 0.022 0.034 0.076 0.031 0.359 0.421 
City FE - - - - - Yes Yes 
Size FE - - Yes - - - Yes 
Industry FE - - - Yes - - Yes 
Cluster City City City City City City City 
 
Note: dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933. danat (grossbank) 
denotes dummy variable with value 1 if firm is connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank 
(any other Grossbank). firm age and log(assets) denote firm age as of 1934 and log of total 
firm assets. Standard errors are clustered on the city level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Wage bill and unemployment 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES wage bill wage bill unemployment unemployment 
          
exposure -0.470 -0.559**   
 (0.310) (0.261)   
wage bill growth   -0.009* -0.008* 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Observations 81 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.032 0.118 0.037 0.206 
City Controls - Yes - Yes 
 
Note: dependent variables are growth in city wage bill from 1929 to 1933 and change in city 
unemployment rate 1930 to 1933. exposure denotes city exposure to Danatbank borrowers. 
City controls include log population, share of protestants, Jews, and blue collar workers, as 
well as city coordinates. All regressions use robust standard errors. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. 
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Table 5: City unemployment 
 
Dependent variable is city change in unemployment 1930-33 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     exposure > 0 
            
exposure 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.042* 0.054** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) 
log pop 1930  0.011*** 0.005 0.007*** 0.009*** 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
share blue collar  -0.021 -0.016 -0.072** 0.002 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) 
share jewish  -0.166 -0.118 0.237 0.061 
  (0.282) (0.287) (0.395) (0.274) 
share protestants  -0.015 -0.015 -0.007 -0.029* 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) 
city latitude  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007 -0.005* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
city longitude  -0.000 0.000 -0.006** 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
      
Observations 191 191 191 186 108 
R-squared 0.072 0.260 0.277 0.453 0.232 
City Size FE - - Yes - - 
Province FE - - - Yes - 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city unemployment rate from 1930 to 1933. exposure 
denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. Standard errors are 
cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 6: City NSDAP votes 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NS 30-33 NS 30-33 NS 30-33 NSDAP maj. NSDAP maj. NSDAP maj. 
              
exposure 0.033 0.077*** 0.093*** 0.301 0.414* 0.452* 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.270) (0.248) (0.235) 
log pop 1930  -0.006 -0.006*  0.111*** 0.093*** 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.030) (0.034) 
share blue collar  0.017 0.007  0.827** 1.059*** 
  (0.045) (0.041)  (0.385) (0.382) 
share jewish  0.590 0.386  -3.638 2.996 
  (0.536) (0.610)  (4.057) (5.385) 
share protestants  0.063*** 0.069***  0.418*** 0.616*** 
  (0.016) (0.020)  (0.141) (0.191) 
city latitude  0.001 -0.015*  -0.048* -0.238*** 
  (0.003) (0.008)  (0.025) (0.071) 
city longitude  0.005*** 0.007*  0.005 0.031 
  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.038) 
       
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 
R-squared 0.005 0.284 0.399 0.006 0.119 0.222 
Province FE - - Yes - - Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city NSDAP votes from 1930 to 1933 in columns (1)-
(3), and dummy equals 1 if NSDAP won majority in city in columns (4)-(6). exposure denotes 
city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. Standard errors are cluster-
robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 7: City NSDAP votes – predicted 
 
Dependent variable is change in NSDAP votes 30-33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
UE 30-33 -0.038    
 (0.074)    
UE 30-33 (predicted)  0.939*  0.148** 
  (0.515)  (0.064) 
UE 30-33 (residual)   -0.093 -0.069 
   (0.073) (0.068) 
     
Observations 187 187 187 187 
R-squared 0.269 -0.460 0.266 0.293 
City controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city NSDAP votes from 1930 to 1933. UE 30-33 
denotes change in city unemployment from 1930 to 1933. predicted is unemployment change 
predicted by city exposure to Danat, residual the residual of the first stage. Standard errors are 
cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 8: City NSDAP votes – heterogeneity 
 
Dependent variable is change in NSDAP votes 30-33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 low AS high AS no pog yes pog creditor debtor 
       
exposure 0.009 0.123*** -0.111 0.122** 0.130*** 0.051 
 (0.090) (0.043) (0.146) (0.059) (0.042) (0.041) 
       
Observations 40 42 25 37 88 99 
R-squared 0.364 0.338 0.552 0.373 0.446 0.194 
City controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city NSDAP votes from 1930 to 1933. exposure 
denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. low/high AS 
denotes ares with low/high vote share for anti-Semitic parties in elections around 1900. no/yes 
pog denotes areas that did not and did have a pogrom in 1349. creditor/debtor denotes areas 
where deposits exceed (are less than) loans. All regressions include basic city-level controls. 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 9: Inter-racial marriages 1930-1933 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES jewish/non-jewish jewish/non-jewish jewish/jewish jewish/jewish 
          
danat * post-July31 -0.0816** -0.116** -0.00247 -0.00513 
 (0.0362) (0.0481) (0.00472) (0.00460) 
grossbank * post-July31  0.209  0.0645** 
  (0.177)  (0.0325) 
log pop 1930  0.194  -0.0318 
  (0.520)  (0.0428) 
     
Observations 2,234 1,970 2,234 1,970 
R-squared 0.675 0.667 0.101 0.107 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Note: This table reports the results of a regression of the log number of marriages in a city on 
a city’s exposure to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank and a dummy post-July31, which is 1 after 
July 1931 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log number 
of marriages between a jewish and a non-jewish person. The dependent variable in columns 
(3) and (4) is the log number of marriages between two jewish persons. Standard errors are 
clustered on the city level.c
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Table 10: City exposure and exports 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES UE 30-33 UE 30-33 NS 30-33 NS 30-33 UE 30-33 NS 30-33 
              
exposure     0.052** 0.071** 
     (0.022) (0.029) 
log exports 0.004** 0.004** 0.002 0.004 0.003* 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
       
Observations 191 191 189 189 191 189 
R-squared 0.030 0.251 0.004 0.272 0.272 0.293 
City Controls - Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city unemployment (UE) and NSDAP votes (NS) from 
1930 to 1933. exposure denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner 
Bank. Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 11: City exposure and exports, predicted unemployment 
  
Dependent variable is change in NSDAP votes 30-33 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  predicted by danat predicted by exports 
    
UE 30-33 -0.052   
 (0.101)   
UE 30-33 (predicted)  1.284* 1.490 
  (0.705) (1.212) 
    
Observations 187 187 187 
R-squared 
City Controls 
0.269 
Yes 
-0.460 
Yes 
-0.703 
Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city NSDAP votes from 1930 to 1933. UE 30-33 
denotes change in city unemployment from 1930 to 1933. predicted is unemployment change 
predicted by city exposure (column (2)) and log exports (column (3)) to Danat. Standard 
errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 12: City KPD votes – heterogeneity 
 
Dependent variable is change in KPD votes 30-33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   low AS high AS no pog yes pog creditor debtor 
         
expsoure 0.032* 0.053*** 0.046 0.035 0.201*** 0.023 -0.011 0.069*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.039) (0.030) (0.066) (0.034) (0.014) (0.024) 
         
Observations 188 188 39 41 25 37 88 98 
R-squared 0.022 0.163 0.222 0.350 0.475 0.060 0.254 0.273 
City Controls - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city KPD votes from 1930 to 1933. exposure denotes 
city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. low/high AS denotes ares 
with low/high vote share for anti-Semitic parties in elections around 1900. no/yes pog denotes 
areas that did not and did have a pogrom in 1349. creditor/debtor denotes areas where 
deposits exceed (are less than) loans. All regressions include basic city-level controls. 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: City KPD votes – predicted 
 
Dependent variable is change in KPD votes 30-33 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
UE 30-33 -0.051    
 (0.088)    
UE 30-33 (predicted)  1.044*  0.160** 
  (0.625)  (0.075) 
UE 30-33 (residual)   -0.113 -0.085 
   (0.093) (0.083) 
     
Observations 186 186 186 186 
R-squared 0.109 -0.780 0.106 0.138 
City controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city KPD votes from 1930 to 1933. UE 30-33 denotes 
change in city unemployment from 1930 to 1933. predicted is unemployment change 
predicted by city exposure to Danat, residual the residual of the first stage. Standard errors are 
cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 14: Other outcome variables  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES synagogue synagogue dep/pop dep/pop 
     
expsoure 0.960*** 0.435** 0.226** 0.146* 
 (0.189) (0.217) (0.096) (0.081) 
     
Observations 193 193 192 192 
R-squared 0.069 0.264 0.029 0.220 
City Controls - Yes - Yes 
 
Note: dependent variable is dummy equals 1 if synagogue was damaged or destroyed in 1938 
pogrom in columns (1)-(2), and total deportations as share of Jewish population in columns 
(3)-(4). exposure denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. 
Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 15: Firm level quantile regression 
 
Dependent variable is firm wage bill growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
                
danat -0.075*** -0.058 -0.042 -0.090 -0.051 -0.425 -1.017** 
 (0.019) (0.041) (0.063) (0.062) (0.105) (0.308) (0.436) 
Constant -0.821*** -0.639*** -0.181 0.348 0.818* 1.880 0.785 
 (0.108) (0.160) (0.181) (0.275) (0.471) (1.648) (1.989) 
        
Observations 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
 
Note: dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933. danat denotes 
dummy variable with value 1 if firm is connected to Danatbank or Dresdner bank. All 
regressions include controls grossbank, firm age, and log(assets). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * 
p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Firm level regions 
 
Dependent variable is firm wage bill growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 full sample no austria no bremen no ruhr 
          
danat -0.204*** -0.196*** -0.188*** -0.209*** 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) 
     
Observations 386 323 375 332 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.022 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster City City City City 
 
Note: dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933. danat denotes 
dummy variable with value 1 if firm is connected to Danatbank or Dresdner bank. All 
regressions include controls grossbank, firm age, and log(assets). No REGION excludes firms 
in REGION from estimation. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 17: Firm level clustering 
 
Dependent variable is firm wage bill growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
danat -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** 
 (0.061) (0.073) (0.051) (0.066) (0.033) 
      
Observations 386 386 386 386 386 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster City Robust Industry Size City and Industry 
 
Note: dependent variable is growth in firm wage bill from 1929 to 1933. danat denotes 
dummy variable with value 1 if firm is connected to Danatbank or Dresdner bank. All 
regressions include controls grossbank, firm age, and log(assets). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * 
p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: City unemployment 
 
Dependent variable is city change in unemployment 1930-33 over population 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     exposure > 0 
            
exposure 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.017* 0.025** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
log pop 1930  0.005*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
share blue collar  -0.005 -0.003 -0.028** 0.014 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) 
share jewish  -0.066 -0.045 0.123 0.080 
  (0.135) (0.138) (0.188) (0.143) 
share protestants  -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
city latitude  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
city longitude  -0.000 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Observations 193 193 193 188 109 
R-squared 0.076 0.259 0.273 0.462 0.216 
City Size FE - - Yes - - 
Province FE - - - Yes - 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city unemployment rate, standardized by population, 
from 1930 to 1933. exposure denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or 
Dresdner Bank. Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 19: City level quantile regression 
 
Dependent variable is city change in unemployment 1930-33 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
                
exposure 0.050 0.043 0.081*** 0.050** 0.056*** 0.049 0.046 
 (0.046) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.044) (0.050) 
Constant 0.281 0.339*** 0.276*** 0.232** 0.360** 0.239 0.387** 
 (0.179) (0.104) (0.099) (0.108) (0.142) (0.151) (0.180) 
        
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in city unemployment rate from 1930 to 1933. exposure 
denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. Standard errors are 
cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20: City level quantile regression 
 
Dependent variable is city change in NSDAP vote share 1930-33 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
                
exposure 0.084 0.041 0.071 0.068* 0.064* 0.041 0.094*** 
 (0.054) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.018) 
Constant -0.141 0.091 0.159 0.121 0.070 0.128 0.100 
 (0.183) (0.144) (0.183) (0.131) (0.193) (0.183) (0.166) 
        
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in NSDAP vote share from 1930 to 1933. exposure 
denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or Dresdner Bank. Standard errors are 
cluster-robust. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 21: City level placebo election 
 
Dependent variable is city change in NSDAP vote share 1928-30 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
exposure -0.046 -0.037 -0.048* -0.042 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) 
exposure (GB)    0.010 
    (0.029) 
     
Observations 193 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.009 0.303 0.359 0.303 
City Controls - Yes Yes Yes 
Wahlkreis FE - - Yes - 
 
Note: dependent variable is change in NSDAP vote share from 1928 to 1930, prior to the 
default of Danat. exposure (exposure (GB)) denotes city exposure to firms connected to 
Danatbank or Dresdner Bank (other Grossbanks). Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
 
Table 22: Tradable industries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 firm level city level 
VARIABLES wage bill wage bill UE 30-33 UE 30-33 
     
danat -0.255*** -0.202**   
 (0.086) (0.084)   
tradable industry 0.104 0.067   
 (0.113) (0.117)   
danat X tradable industry 0.152 0.127   
 (0.189) (0.183)   
exposure   0.175*** 0.101** 
   (0.043) (0.042) 
high exports   0.015* 0.013 
   (0.009) (0.008) 
exposure X high exports   -0.191*** -0.154** 
   (0.061) (0.062) 
     
Observations 272 272 128 128 
R-squared 0.021 0.033 0.105 0.319 
Controls - Firm - City 
Cluster City City Robust Robust 
 
Note: dependent variable is wage bill growth in columns (1)-(2), and change in 
unemployment rate from 1930 to 1933 in columns (3)-(4). Danat denotes firms borrowing 
from Danat or Dresdner, exposure denotes city exposure to firms connected to Danatbank or 
Dresdner Bank. Tradable industries are firms in top tercile of industries by export shares, high 
exports are cities in to tercile of city export exposure. Standard errors are cluster-robust. *** p 
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Appendix A: Data  
 
Table A1: Variables and data sources 
 
Variable Source Type 
   
Firm-level variables   
   
Assets Handbook of German Stock Companies in Reichsmark 
Wages bill Handbook of German Stock Companies in Reichsmark 
Bank-affiliation Handbook of German Stock Companies dummy 
Firm age Handbook of German Stock Companies in years 
   
City-level variables   
   
Exposure Handbook of German Stock Companies [0,1] 
Exports Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reichs in Reichsmark 
Unemployment Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte in thousand 
Population Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Städte in thousand 
Labor force 1933 census in thousand 
Share of protestants 1925 census % 
Share of Jews 1925 census % 
Share of blue collar workers 1925 census % 
Election outcomes Statistik des Deutschen Reiches (ICPSR 42)  
Debtor/creditor Enquetekommission zur Untersuchung der Bankenkrise dummy 
Anti-Semitic votes Statistische Jahrbücher des dt. Reichsamts für Statistik  
Pogrom in 1349 Germania Judaica dummy 
Synagogues damaged or destroyed Alicke (2008) dummy 
Total deportations German federal archive (Bundesarchiv) in thousand 
 
Note: This table lists main variables, data sources, and units. For details, see text. 
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Appendix B: Additional figures 
 
Figure B1: “Der Stürmer” caricature 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows a caricature out of pro-Nazi newspaper “Der Stürmer” in May 1931 
around the beginning of the German banking crisis. The caption says “The Jew banker and the 
German business man”, suggesting that Jewish-led banks are to blame for the dire economic 
situation of the German people. 
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